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THE BATTLEFIELD OF TOMORROW, TODAY: CAN A CYBERATTACK
EVER RISE TO AN “ACT OF WAR?”
Christopher M. Sanders*
I. INTRODUCTION
“War. War never changes.”1 Such a phrase has resonated throughout all of
human history. Brutal, forceful, evil, murderous, barbaric. War has taken different
forms in different domains such as land, air, and sea. From fists to spears; from
spears to swords; from swords to all manner of firearms. But now, for the first time
in human history, war has changed. No longer are the effects of war felt through the
intensity of nuclear warheads, the sound of armed combat, or the booming of
cannons. Rather, the effects of war are felt through the whisper heard from the click
of a computer. Cyberspace is now the domain of war.2
The United States federal government is responsible for defending the
American people. “Until recently, the government has fulfilled that role almost
exclusively through nuclear deterrence and conventional military forces.”3 But war
has changed, and society must adapt to its changes to effectively defend our borders.
Such a statement begs the question: What constitutes an act of war in
cyberspace? The developed world has adopted provisions, laws, and agreements
dealing with acts of war on land, air, and sea. The leading modern example of
military law and alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”).
NATO, an alliance between twenty-eight different nations, is one of the longest
standing military alliances in recent history.4 Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty
elicits a response from the twenty-eight nations of NATO in response to “armed
attacks.”5 This underscores the policy that if you interfere with one, you deal with
all. Yet, despite NATO’s history and prestige, it remains in its current state unfit to
handle acts of terror and war in cyberspace because it has yet to define when such
acts occur. Cyberattacks do not precisely fit the criteria of “armed” conflict or an
*
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1
Ron Perlman, FALLOUT 3 (Bethesda Softworks LLC 2008).
2
See Steve Evans, Cyberspace is New Domain for War: NATO, INFOSECURITY
MAGAZINE (June 16, 2016), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberspace-isnew-domain-for-war/ [https://perma.cc/2T8K-SCN7].
3
Mike Rounds, Defining a Cyber Act of War, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/defining-a-cyber-act-of-war-1462738124 [https://perma.cc/U
YA4-CLXU].
4
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (signing the
Treaty were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
5
Id.
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“act of war.” Rather, cyberspace remains something misunderstood in its own
ethereal and unknown realm.
Cyber warfare is a twenty-first century concept, one that we have only begun
to comprehend and develop. Part II develops the science and recent history behind
incidents involving cyberspace. Part III argues that cyberattacks can constitute an
armed attack or an act of war through triggering the right to self-defense. Part IV
proposes a tiered analysis and subsequent response to military incidents involving
cyber. Part V recommends modification to the North Atlantic Treaty and similar
treaties, laws, and agreements so that they can effectively and efficiently implement
these suggestions to respond to what is now considered “21st century warfare.” 6
Part VI concludes and summarizes.
II. THE SCIENCE AND RECENT HISTORY OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING CYBER
A. The Creation of the Internet
Everything has a beginning—even cyberspace—which is largely a byproduct
of the internet. It is important to understand the origin of cyberspace to more fully
comprehend and anticipate its future. Michael Gervais, in his article titled Cyber
Attacks and the Laws of War, discusses this and the inception of cyber warfare from
its initial moorings.7 He notes that the Cold War acted as a catalyst to the creation
of the Internet.8 The article also notes that “[a]fter World War II, tension quickly
escalated between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s
launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 caused particular alarm in the United States.”9
The United States government began to emphasize technology and science to gain
footing in the conflict and created a new agency called the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (“ARPA”), which was “invaluable for the creation of the
internet.”10
The ARPA worked to invent a system of communication that would be difficult
to detect and intercept by breaking up messages into smaller components spread
across different nodes or routes of networking.11 The most difficult challenge was
“figuring out how to make all of the computers work together.”12 Because computers
needed to adopt a standard and universal protocol, “Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf
6
See Ty Cobb, Cyber Warfare: Where the 21st Century Conflicts Will be Fought,
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://harvardnsj.org/2012/03/cyber-warfarewhere-the-21st-century-conflicts-will-be-fought/ [https://perma.cc/VJG7-SE2S].
7
Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 1 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 8
(2012).
8
Id. at 11.
9
Id.
10
Gervais, supra note 7, at 12; see also Larry Abramson, Sputnik Left Legacy for U.S.
Science Education, NPR (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=14829195 [https://perma.cc/N8LR-3P8M].
11
Gervais, supra note 7, at 12.
12
Id. at 15.
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designed the standard protocol that is still in place today—the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). [Which] specifies how data should be
formatted, addressed, transmitted, routed, and received at the destination.”13 This
became the “ARPANET.” When the ARPANET adopted TCP/IP in 1983, the
Internet was born.14
B. The Creation of Cyberattacks
The Internet’s creation allowed individuals to traverse this new domain which
both fostered and hindered its progression, inevitably leading to the creation of
cyberattacks. Cyberattacks occur most often through the accessing of a computer or
other electronic system without the owner’s consent through Malware.15
“Malware—similar to software—consists of programs or protocols that tell
computers what to do. Those instructions are often destructive, intrusive, or
annoying. Unfortunately, just as software has become more innovative and
sophisticated over time, so, too, has malware.”16 Malware began with the Creeper
Virus, essentially a mere annoyance, which would simply display the message “I’M
THE CREEPER: CATCH ME IF YOU CAN.”17 Malware evolved shortly thereafter
in 1988 with the Morris Worm, which infected 10% of all computers connected to
the Internet.18 What began as mere annoyance quickly escalated into inflicting harm
and destroying property from the inside, which evolved into “cyber-crimes.”19 “It
was not long before states began using malware as a method of attacking adversaries
in what is now known as a cyberattack.”20

13

Gervais, supra note 7, at 15.
See Mitch Waldrop, DARPA and the Internet Revolution, DARPA: 50 YEARS OF
BRIDGING THE GAP 78, 85 (2008), https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/(2O15)%20Global%
20Nav%20-%20About%20Us%20-%20History%20-%20Resources%20-%2050th%20-%2
0Internet%20(Approved).pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8UY-XJAQ].
15
Gervais, supra note 7, at 16.
16
Id. at 16–17.
17
Georgi Dalakov, First Computer Virus of Bob Thomas, HISTORY OF COMPUTERS,
http://history-computer.com/Internet/Maturing/Thomas.html
[https://perma.cc/MLX62V24].
18
See Brian Krebs, A Short History of Computer Viruses and Attacks, SECURITY FOCUS
(Feb. 14, 2003), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/2445 [https://perma.cc/5S2F-XESG];
Gervais, supra note 7, at 17.
19
Gervais, supra note 7, at 17.
20
Id. at 17.
14
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Another form of cyberattack is accomplished with what is known as a botnet.
Botnets are defined as “[a] network of private computers infected with malicious
software and controlled as a group without the owners’ knowledge, e.g. to send
spam.”21 The impact of botnets has been colossal: the damage caused by botnets is
estimated to be greater than “$113 billion in losses globally, with approximately 375
million computers infected each year, equaling more than one million victims per
day, translating to 12 victims per second.”22
C. Recent Incidents in Cyberspace
We live in an electronic world. Society is perpetually surrounded by cyberspace
through our phones, computers, cars, televisions, and much more. It takes on even
more forms—intangible and ominous—including internet connectivity, satellite
transmission, and radio waves. Because of this, the science behind cyberspace is
difficult to fathom. The discovery of cyberspace raises questions as to its real origin.
For example, NASA occasionally receives unexplained cyber transmissions from
deep space.23 Cyberspace could very well evolve in the future. What is known as
cyberspace today may be entirely different in a century, or even a decade from now.
Because of the omnipresence of cyberspace in much of the developed world, any
form of cyberattack is conceivable. There is no real limit to what “hackers” can do.
Take, for example, a simple automobile. Electric vehicles are becoming
increasingly popular. As of the date of this Note, over half a million electric vehicles
have been sold in the United States alone.24 With this rapid increase in electric
vehicles also comes the possibility of a cyberattack on such vehicles. Recently,
hackers demonstrated that it is possible to “remotely unlock the [Tesla] Model S’
doors, start the vehicle and drive away.”25 Hackers can even “issue a ‘kill’ command
to a [Tesla] Model S to shut down the vehicle’s systems, bringing it to a stop,” all
21

Botnet, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
Robert Anderson, Jr., Cyber Security, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving
Threats to the Homeland, FBI (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-terrorism-and-beyond-addressing-evolving-threats-to-the-homeland [https://perma.
cc/2HA4-AEJ3].
23
See Fiona MacDonald, Mysterious Repeating Radio Signals Have Been Detected
Coming From Outside
Our
Galaxy,
SCI. ALERT
(Mar.
3,
2016),
http://www.sciencealert.com/mysterious-repeating-radio-signals-have-been-detectedcoming-from-outside-our-galaxy [https://perma.cc/PK47-Z2VZ]; Robin Seemangal, Not a
Drill: SETI Is Investigating a Possible Extraterrestrial Signal From Deep Space, OBSERVER
(Aug. 29, 2016), http://observer.com/2016/08/not-a-drill-seti-is-investigating-a-possibleextraterrestrial-signal-from-deep-space/ [https://perma.cc/2AEY-FRQD].
24
See Jeff Cobb, Americans Buy Their Half-Millionth Plug-in Car, HYBRID CARS
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.hybridcars.com/americans-buy-their-half-millionth-plug-in-car/
[https://perma.cc/3SSU-KY2U].
25
Antuan Goodwin, Tesla hackers explain how they did it at Defcon, CNET (Aug. 9,
2015), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/tesla-hackers-explain-how-they-did-it-at-defcon-23/ [https://perma.cc/DPF2-GRJD].
22
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through the vehicle’s onboard network.26 They were also able to remotely “control
the radio and touch screen displays and open and close the trunk.”27 However, such
control over vehicles is not confined to purely electronic vehicles. Just before these
Tesla hackings, cybersecurity researchers were “able to take remote control of a Jeep
Cherokee, leading Fiat Chrysler Automobiles to recall 1.4 million vehicles.”28
Conversely, there are valid arguments that hacking can be used for good instead
of evil. Consider a recent conviction of Deric Lostutter who indirectly aided the
government in identifying individuals who committed rape in Steubenville, Ohio.29
In 2012, two males gang-raped a sixteen-year-old female after she passed out from
intoxication.30 The males removed her clothing, penetrated her vagina and forced
their penises into her mouth while she was unconscious.31 Moreover, the males
photographed the incident to show their crimes to their friends.32 A hacker, Deric
Lostutter, from “Anonymous”—an underground organization known for its threats
and actions in cyberspace—gained access to these photographs through cyberspace
and threatened to release them if they did not publicly apologize for their heinous
crimes.33 The rapists were eventually prosecuted and incarcerated for a term of
approximately twelve to twenty-four months.34 The hacker, Deric Lostutter, pled not
guilty and was recently sentenced to twenty-four months incarceration—twelve
months more than what one of the rapists received—for multiple counts under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.35 Such a disparity among punishments reflects our
26

Id.
Samantha Masunaga, Researchers Hack a Tesla Model S, Bring Car to Stop, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hy-tesla-hack-20150806story.html [https://perma.cc/6852-QV6H].
28
Id.
29
See Andrew Blake, Deric Lostutter, Hacktivist, Charged Over Anonymous
Cybercampaign Spurred by Steubenville Rape Cases, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/7/deric-lostutter-hacktivist-charged-overanonymous-/ [https://perma.cc/65YY-X7XR].
30
See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape That Social Media Brought
to Light, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/teenagersfound-guilty-in-rape-in-steubenville-ohio.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RLG6-H5RQ].
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Crimesider Staff, Hacker Who Called Attention to Ohio Rape Case Facing
Charges, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/steubenville-ohiohacker-kyanonymous-who-called-attention-to-rape-case-facing-charges/
[https://perma.cc/7XHD-FB89].
34
Id.
35
See Andrew Blake, Deric Lostutter, hacker, sentenced to 2 years in prison for crimes
tied
to
Steubenville
rape
case,
WASH.
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2017),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/deric-lostutter-hacker-sentenced-2years-prison-cr/ [https://perma.cc/8ULY-AFRA]; see also Cortney Drakeford, Deric
Lostutter Faces More Prison Time than Football Players, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/steubenville-rape-case-update-hacker-dericlostutter-faces-more-prison-time-football-2413322 [https://perma.cc/359B-5EYC].
27
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cultural fear of cyberspace: a fear of the unknown. We fear the apparent unlimited
power of a cyberattack.
Some of the more popular episodes involving cyberspace include the hack into
the Democratic National Committee and AshleyMadison.com. Ashley Madison is a
website directed towards males and females who are married but still wish to date.36
Its slogan was “Life is short. Have an affair.”37 Participation on Ashley Madison
requires creating a personal account and profile.38 The information was apparently
kept confidential and discreet.39 Prior to this incident, customers could also pay an
additional fee to have that information deleted in “cyberspace.”40 In 2015, the
website garnered national attention after hackers stole and released the customers’
information.41 The release included emails, names, home addresses, sexual fantasies,
and credit card information shown in the customers’ profiles.42 The hack affected
over thirty million customers.43 The hackers threatened to release the information if
the site was not closed by a specific date.44 Because the website was still up by the
threatened date, true to their word, the hackers released all of the information—
including the information of those customers that paid an extra $19 fee to have their
data “deleted.”45 The consequences were severe: suicide, multiple class action
lawsuits seeking in total over $1 billion in damages, six-figure bounty offers for
finding the hacker, job loss, and much more.46

36
ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com/?reg=1 [https://perma.cc/72P9XJNV].
37
Id.
38
Frequently Asked Questions, ASHLEY MADISON, https://www.ashleymadison.com/
app/public/faq.p [https://perma.cc/6YTL-BMR2].
39
Id.
40
See Team Register, What Ashley Madison Did and Did NOT Delete If You Paid $19–
and Why It May Cost It $5m+, THE REGISTER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2015/08/25/us_class_action_ashley_madison/ [https://perma.cc/2F5V-5WTD].
41
See Charles Riley, Hackers Threaten to Release Names from Adultery Website, CNN
MONEY (July 20, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/20/technology/ashley-madisonhack/ [https://perma.cc/DH6Y-RV7R].
42
Id.
43
Melissa J. Sachs, Cheating Website Ashley Madison Hit with Data Breach Suits, 33
WESTLAW J. COMPUTER AND INTERNET 6, Sept. 11, 2015, at 1.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Dieter Holger, 8 Consequences of the Ashley Madison Hack, INQUISITR (Aug. 27,
2015),
http://www.inquisitr.com/2366085/8-consequences-of-the-ashley-madison-hack/
[https://perma.cc/URC7-LF7L].
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The Democratic National Committee (“DNC”)—the governing body of the
Democratic party in the United States of America—was also hacked, presumably by
Russia, releasing email correspondence between members of the DNC.47 As a body,
the DNC is to remain unbiased towards a specific individual within the democratic
party. However, the correspondence released hinted towards the opposite:
Many of the most damaging emails suggest the committee was actively
trying to undermine Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign. . . . [T]hese
examples came late in the primary—after Hillary Clinton was clearly
headed for victory—but they belie the [DNC’s] stated neutrality in the race
even at that late stage.48
Cyberattacks have also been launched in the last decade against Georgia in its
war with the Russian Federation in 2008, against Estonia in 2007, and against the
Iranian Nuclear Facilities with the Stuxnet worm in 2010.49 The Stuxnet worm was
designed to attack industrial control systems by forcing “Iran’s centrifuges to spin
out of control” and to “deceive operators into thinking the machines were operating
normally when they were actually tearing themselves apart.”50 The Stuxnet worm
affected the entire world, but its harmful effect was directed towards Iran’s nuclear
program.51 Iran did not release specific details describing the effects of the attack,
but “it is currently estimated that the Stuxnet worm destroyed 984 uranium enriching
centrifuges.”52
D. In Response
In response to these ever increasing cyberattacks, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation created a Cyber division in 2002. In 2014, the FBI announced the
indictments of high profile hackers that had penetrated corporations and stolen
millions of dollars and created sophisticated malware—some of which have infected
47

See David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to Influence
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/usformally-accuses-russia-of-stealing-dnc-emails.html [https://perma.cc/Y4N7-YWT5].
48
Aaron Blake, Here are the latest, most damaging things in the DNC’s leaked emails,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/07/24/here-are-the-latest-most-damaging-things-in-the-dncs-leaked-emails/
[https://perma.cc/6LXU-DRCA].
49
INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 1–2 (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
50
Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 525,
570 (2012).
51
Id.
52
Michael Holloway, Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities, STANFORD
U.
(July
16,
2015),
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/holloway1/
[https://perma.cc/8U9U-F5AT].
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over half a million computers worldwide and stolen more than $100 million in
total.53 “[In August 2014], a federal grand jury indicted Su Bin, a Chinese national,
on five felony offenses stemming from a computer hacking scheme that involved
the theft of trade secrets from American defense contractors, including The Boeing
Company, which manufactures the C-17 military transport aircraft.”54
Events such as these have raised eyebrows universally and have earned our
worldwide attention and concern. The United Kingdom, in its 2010 National
Security Strategy, labeled “cyber attack[s], including by other States, and by
organised [sic] crime and terrorists” as a “Tier One” threat to their national
security.55 The United States has responded to this new domain of war by creating a
new division in its military called “Cyber Command” to effectively respond and
potentially attack its enemies in cyberspace. Its mission statement is as follows:
“United States Army Cyber Command directs and conducts integrated electronic
warfare, information and cyberspace operations as authorized, or directed, to ensure
freedom of action in and through cyberspace and the information environment, and
to deny the same to our adversaries.”56
NATO also recognized the threat of cyberattacks, committing itself to “develop
further [its] ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks,
including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national
cyber-defen[s]e capabilities . . . and better integrating NATO cyber awareness,
warning and response with member nations.”57
While the world has recognized the threat of cyberattacks and exploitation in
cyberspace, it has done little to develop the law surrounding this issue. No one has
yet defined when a cyberattack constitutes an act of war.58 Without a definition or
guide to further our understanding, it will remain something misunderstood and
feared; and without a clear, universal understanding of cyber warfare, especially in
the legal realm, we will remain unprepared to respond to it. Thus, it is necessary to
consider when an action is an “act of war” in cyberspace to gain insight into this new
domain of war.

53

Robert Anderson, Jr., Cyber Security, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving
Threats to the Homeland, FBI (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-terrorism-and-beyond-addressing-evolving-threats-to-the-homeland [https://perma.
cc/2HA4-AEJ3].
54
Id.
55
HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 11 (Oct. 2010).
56
Our Mission, U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND, http://www.arcyber.army.mil/Pages/
ArcyberHome.aspx [https://perma.cc/CBR9-QP8Y].
57
NATO, ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENSE: STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE
DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION 16–17 (2010).
58
See Bryant Jordan, US Still Has No Definition for Cyber Act of War, MILITARY.COM
(June 22, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/22/us-still-has-no-definitionfor-cyber-act-of-war.html [https://perma.cc/RRG8-4YQV].
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III. AN ACT OF WAR
An act of war has not been defined in cyberspace. America, and the developed
world, need to define and determine exactly when an act in cyberspace can constitute
an act of war. Desiree Gargona argues that an act of war is a term of art borrowed
from international law.59 There, it is defined as a “‘use of force or other action by
one state against another’ which ‘[t]he state acted against recognizes . . . as an act of
war, either by use of retaliatory force or a declaration of war.’”60 Of course, this does
little to help a nation who has yet to define “act of war” since the definition presumes
the victim state has a definition in place by its own terms. In America, an “act of
war” on traditional domains of war is codified and defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 as
“any act occurring in the course of—(A) declared war; (B) armed conflict, whether
or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or (C) armed conflict
between military forces of any origin.”61 However, cyberspace does not involve
“arms,” leaving a persistent confusion as to what could constitute an act of war in
cyberspace.
We have at least one American example of an act of war in recent history, albeit
not in cyberspace: September 11, 2001 (“9/11”). On that date, Islamic Extremists
hijacked four planes flying above the United States.62 One of the airplanes flew
directly into the north tower of New York’s World Trade Center.63 Minutes later, a
second plane flew into the south tower.64 A third plane flew into the Pentagon, with
a fourth crashing in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.65 Thousands of Americans
lost their lives.66 The event was indeed an act of war that triggered the right of selfdefense for the American people.67 However, some scholars disagree over whether
9/11 was, in fact, an act of war.68 If 9/11 could not reach the threshold of an act of

59
Desiree Gargano, An Act of War: Finding A Meaning for What Congress Has Left
Undefined, 29 TOURO L. REV. 147, 152 (2012).
60
Id. (quoting JAMES R. FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW 6 (1992)).
61
18 U.S.C. § 2331(4) (effective Oct. 26, 2001).
62
See A Minute-By-Minute Breakdown Of What Happened On 9/11, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/9-11-timeline_us_57d300d8e4b06a
74c9f48c09 [https://perma.cc/77SL-A29S].
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Gervais, supra note 7, at 37.
68
Compare Michael S. Rozeff, 9/11 Was Not An Act of War, LEWROCKWELL.COM
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2015/04/michael-s-rozeff/911-was-not-anact-of-war/ [https://perma.cc/A49R-H73H] (arguing that 9/11 was not an act of war because
it was not committed by another country or military force), with John Siniff, Voices: By any
definition, 9/11 was an ‘act of war,’ USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/10/voices-911-act-of-war/15385439/
[https://perma.cc/A6RH-LR78] (stating that President Bush and 86% of Americans believed
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war thus triggering self-defense, it is nearly unfathomable to ascertain the degree of
harm required to reach that threshold as nearly 3,000 innocent people lost their lives
that day.
While acts of war are more easily understood on traditional domains of war,
such as land, air, and sea, they remain perplexing in their own right. Thus, it is easier
to analyze this issue as whether a showing of force triggers the right to national selfdefense rather than quibbling over whether an action is an act of war. In this light, it
makes sense to analyze “act of war” and “self-defense” synonymously rather than
simply blanket labeling heinous uses of force an act of war. Acts of war do not
necessarily trigger war in the United States, but rather provide justification to declare
war. It is logical, then, to argue that when an action triggers the right to self-defense,
then that action would likely constitute an act of war as well. Whenever the term
“act of war” is used, it is easier to understand this through analyzing when the right
to responsive self-defense is activated.
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (“NATO CCD
COE”) enlisted the help of various international experts to demystify the legal issues
of cyberspace in 2009.69 The result was one of the leading legal documents on issues
in cyberspace: the Tallinn Manual. It is “[t]he product of a three-year project by
twenty renowned international law scholars and practitioners,” which discusses the
international law applicable to cyber warfare.70 Through its research and analysis,
the Tallinn Manual established ninety-five black letter rules governing issues related
to cyber conflicts such as “sovereignty, State responsibility, the jus ad bellum,
international humanitarian law, and the law of neutrality.”71 Following each rule is
extensive commentary which explains how each of the experts agreed, or disagreed,
on the formulation of each rule.72 Despite the document’s prestige, none of the
ninety-five rules directly elaborates on when cyberattacks could amount to war, but
rather dictates civility and rules in cyber warfare. 73
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A. Cyberattacks Can Constitute an Act of War Through Triggering the Right
to Self-Defense
The reason such difficulty arises in labeling cyberattacks as an act of war is its
inherent nature. It is not exactly “armed” conflict nor always a display of “force.” It
can be subtle, quiet, unassuming, intangible, and even delayed. Indeed, soldiers
would feel more emotionally detached from their actions by design when controlling
predator drones than those who face their enemies without an electronic screen
between them. Without apparent brutality, an act of war becomes more difficult to
define. Moreover, the Department of Defense has yet to define when a cyberattack
constitutes an act of war.74 The line is sharper when labeling acts of war in traditional
domains rather than cyberspace. Certain acts are more readily definable as an act of
war in land, air, and sea because they either involve armed conflict or they do not,
such as 9/11 or the Cuban Missile Crisis. Such attacks are more readily labeled acts
of war because “[you] know it when you see it[:]” death and destruction.75 Cyber
warfare, on the other hand, can be much subtler, and much more prolonged or
delayed.
Michael Gervais identifies what makes that delineation blurry in cyberspace.
He clarifies that some incidents in cyberspace are merely exploitation, rather than
attack.76 For example, the incidents involving Russia and the DNC as well as
AshleyMadison.com would likely be exploitation rather than attack. Those incidents
were not intended to destroy or cause loss of life, but were rather merely for use in
a selfish manner, which fits the definition of “exploitation.”77 But should there be a
distinction at all between cyber and traditional domains of warfare? This Note
suggests that all domains of war should be analyzed and defined identically, whether
they are tangible or intangible.
The primary question is whether cyberattacks can ever qualify as an act of war
or reach the threshold of an “armed attack.” If the answer is no, then little needs to
be done. However, if the answer is yes—as this Note argues—then thresholds must
be defined as cyberattacks varying in kind as well as in degree. Indeed, “the Obama
administration and the Pentagon made clear that acts like shutting down a U.S.
power grid via a cyberattack could indeed qualify as an act of war that would not
only bring a similar cyber response but maybe even ‘a missile down one of your
smokestacks.’”78
The 114th session of Congress introduced a bill called the Cyber Act of War
Act, directing the President to do two things. First, to “develop a policy for
74
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determining when an action carried out in cyberspace constitutes a use of force
against the United States;” and second, to “revise the Department of Defense Law
of War Manual accordingly.”79 In developing the policy behind this law, Congress
asks the President to consider “(1) the ways in which the effects of a cyber attack
may be equivalent to the effects of an attack using conventional weapons, including
with respect to physical destruction or casualties[] [and] (2) [i]ntangible effects of
significant scope, intensity, or duration.”80 Thus, Congress also agreed that a
cyberattack can constitute an act of war, but failed to provide reasonable guidance
on how that might be defined.
The two more relevant provisions in the United Nations Charter on this issue
are articles 2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”81 This article is primarily known as the use of force
article, and by its terms is prohibitory in purpose. The second is article 51, which
states “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”82 This provision is also prohibitory in nature, but
is even more reactive and entitles a state to respond if unlawful force is used against
them. Such a provision would include NATO, as it is a collective provision on selfdefense.83 However, NATO—or any other nation or organization—cannot
effectively respond to defend a nation if they have not labeled and defined the
threshold of attack that would entitle them to do so.
The reason cyberattacks can qualify, at the very least, as an armed attack is
because any weapon can be used to constitute an unlawful use of force.84 The
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, noted this by referring to articles 2(4) and 51, stating that “[t]hese
provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force,
regardless of the weapons employed.”85
This notion that anything can be considered a weapon was solidified when,
“[t]he Security Council reaffirmed this sentiment when it authorized the United
States to respond forcefully in self-defense to the 9/11 attacks, where the ‘weapons’
were hijacked airplanes.”86 Therefore, “the mere fact that a computer (rather than a
more traditional weapon . . . ) is used during an operation has no bearing on whether
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that operation amounts to a ‘use of force.’”87 That logic leads to the conclusion that
the weapon used has no bearing on whether a nation may respond in self-defense
per the articles cited in the U.N. Charter. Thus, cyberattacks can invoke the right to
self-defense under articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter.
B. When Does a Cyber Attack Constitute an Act of War?
The threshold question that must be decided is when a cyberattack rises to an
act of war or the right to respond in self-defense, either collectively or individually.
One definition might be that any use of force, even in cyberspace, constitutes a per
se armed attack and thus triggers the right to self-defense.88 Under this view “any
offensive action by a military cyber unit is an armed attack because it emanates from
the armed forces of a state.”89 Because this definition is sensitive and malleable,
“[t]he danger is that a single errant soldier could embroil a nation in a protracted
conflict if his or her action permits the target state to respond in self-defense.”90 This
approach appears unreasonable and overbroad as it reaches circumstances that were
never intended to be an unlawful showing of force as shown in the example above.
A second, more reasonable possibility is the “scale and effects” test employed
by the ICJ.91 The ICJ finds a real, substantive distinction between an “armed attack”
and mere “use of force.”92 To distinguish between the two, the ICJ analyzes the scale
and the effects of the attack.93 By design, not every action by a state in cyberspace
triggers the right to collective or individual self-defense because not all presentations
of force rise to the level of “armed attack.” “To know whether a cyber attack meets
the threshold of ‘armed attack’ requires knowing where the de minimis threshold
lies. However, this is a vague and fact-specific rule.”94
Under the scale and effects test, a cyberattack which inflicts “substantial
destruction upon important elements of the target state” through, for example,
destruction of property or the loss of lives, would trigger the right to self-defense
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under article 51.95 This is also reflected in the Tallinn Manual rule 13: “A State that
is the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack may
exercise its inherent right to self-defen[s]e. Whether a cyber operation constitutes an
armed attack depends on its scale and effects.”96 Despite the division among the
experts in the Tallinn Manual on many points, the experts agree that as of 2012, no
international cyber incidents reached the threshold of an armed attack, and
unanimously conclude that a cyberattack, if sufficiently grave, could reach the
threshold of an armed attack to trigger a response from a state.97 In reaching this
conclusion, the experts note that biological, radiological, and chemical attacks could
constitute armed attack despite the absence of “arms”; thus, cyberattacks could as
well.98
C. A Modified Scale and Effects Test
The problem with a scale and effects approach lies in timing. By its definition,
the scale and effects test requires a state to analyze the outcome of an attack to
determine its severity. Thus, there can be no real prevention of cyberattacks before
they occur if the right to exercise self-defense can only be triggered by the outcome
of an unlawful action by another state under this test. It leaves no room for a state to
analyze the intended purpose of an impending attack in cyberspace. Rather, it
requires a state to sit still and watch. Therefore, the best approach would be a
modified scale and effects test, where, if an attack was sufficiently grave and verified
to occur, then self-defense would be triggered.
This, in turn, “has led states to turn to customary international law for the
determination of when it is appropriate to forestall an attack.”99 The Caroline test—
whose name is derived from the American Steamboat Caroline involved in
international disputes between Canada, America, and Britain in the nineteenth
century—determines whether a state may take action in anticipatory self-defense.100
95
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To act in anticipatory self-defense, a state must show “that the ‘necessity of selfdefense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation.’”101 However, even if these difficult thresholds are met, the response
must not be “unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and be kept clearly within it.”102
Concluding that cyberattacks could constitute an armed attack or an act of war
leaves open the question of where the de minimis threshold lies. Michael Gervais
uses two examples to illustrate this point. First, under customary practice, he
suggests “that under conventional notions of force, even small-scale bombings,
artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as ‘armed attacks’ activating Article 51, as
long as they result in, or are capable of resulting in, destruction of property or loss
of lives.”103 On the other hand, an action similar to “the firing of a single missile into
some unpopulated wilderness as a mere display of force would likely not be
sufficient to trigger Article 51, despite violating Article 2(4).”104
Through these examples, the Tallinn Manual establishes a reasonable definition
and answer to cyberattacks in rule 30, which defines cyberattack as “a cyber
operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause
injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”105 The experts argue
that this rule should be interpreted broadly.106 For example, even if the attack is
intercepted and caused no damage or injury, it could still rise to the level of a
cyberattack because, under this definition, the cyber operation must only be
reasonably expected to cause damage to constitute a cyberattack.107 Moreover, if the
actor did not intend the results that followed, it could still constitute a cyberattack if
it resulted in substantial destruction of property or loss of life.108 On the other hand,
“[a] cyber attack that merely creates an inconvenience might be a prohibited use of
force, but it would not rise to the level of an armed attack. In comparison, a cyber
attack capable of substantially destroying property or causing the loss of lives should
trigger the right to self-defense.”109
within it. The British accepted this test by justifying its actions accordingly. As
has been explained by international scholars, the Caroline test requires that
nations show that use of force is necessary due to an imminent threat, and that the
response is proportionate to the threat.
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D. Dealing with Issues in Degree
Another issue with cyberspace and cyberattacks lies in degree. Is there a middle
ground between inconvenience or annoyance and destruction of property or the loss
of lives? What if the cyberattack merely disables a crucial military defense? Or
releases private and personal information about governments or its officials? Should
the right to self-defense be triggered then? Perhaps a more appropriate response in
these situations would be a mere countermeasure to quell or deter the threat. Rule 9
in the Tallinn Manual presents a sound response to such a situation. It states: “A
State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to proportionate
countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible
State.”110 This suggests a countermeasure that would be both similar in degree and
kind. Countermeasure, in this context, is a legal term of art and is distinguishable
from the military’s definition, where countermeasures are more aggressive and seek
to destroy rather than merely quell or deter through proportionate response.111 The
experts in the Tallinn Manual elaborate on appropriate countermeasures in
cyberspace:
Such countermeasures must be intended to induce compliance with
international law by the offending State. For example, suppose State B
launches a cyber operation against an electrical generating facility at a dam
in State A in order to coerce A into increasing the flow of water into a river
running through the two States. State A may lawfully respond with
proportionate countermeasures, such as cyber operations against State B’s
irrigation control system.112
After concluding that cyberattacks could rise to an act of war, and that there are
questions of degree of harm among other issues, how does one effectively codify the
appropriate label and response for each type of attack?
IV. PROPOSING A TIERED ANALYSIS
The only reason cyberspace is so perplexing and complicated in the legal arena
is because it is new. The legal realm dislikes new problems because lawmaking
draws so much on experience, tradition, and history as a guide to enact, amend or
decide a legal issue. Laws take time, experience, and argumentation before much of
anything can be accomplished. Among the many statues carved into the United
States Supreme Courthouse of the great lawgivers—Moses, Plato, and Confucius—
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there is also a tortoise.113 It is a representation of the slow and steady pace the law
takes to reach its goal.114 But rest assured, it reaches the goal. Does the law need to
delineate between cyberspace and the more traditional domains of warfare such as
land, air, and sea? This Note argues in the negative. Cyberattacks do not need to be
separated and treated differently from other acts of war, and such actions in
cyberspace should be analyzed identically to the traditional domains of war.
Cyberattacks, despite their realm being intangible, always result—or are
intended to result—in a tangible consequence. And that standard should be the base
point for determining whether an action constitutes an act of war and where an attack
fits into this tiered analysis. The scale and effects test comes closest to this label,
notwithstanding the timing issues discussed above. The only question that remains
is: What is the result, or intended result, of the cyberattack? We need not fear the
realm of cyber, despite what is shown in Deric Lostutter’s case. 115 Cyber is merely
a route to accomplish indirectly what would be more complicated or dangerous to
do so directly. So, why do we treat acts in cyberspace as something more sinister, or
more heinous than crimes that are committed directly? The results are the same.
Because cyberattacks can take an infinite number of forms with an infinite
variety of results, they should be labeled and analyzed under a tiered structure in
order to respond effectively, proportionally, and legally, rather than under the black
and white analysis typically taken in traditional domains of war. This Note suggests
that a three-tiered approach should be adopted and potential cyberattacks should be
labeled to respond effectively and proportionally to those attacks. This specific
approach is not about precaution or prevention—which are important goals—but
rather, response.
Tier one, the first and highest tier, analyzes the effects of a cyberattack and
whether the attack resulted, or was intended to result, in significant destruction of
property or the loss of lives. Take, for example, the 9/11 attacks. The United States
responded in self-defense against the attacks by Islamic extremists.116 If the attacks
occurred through an electronic hijacking rather than direct hijacking, it is arguable
the results would have been the same. Therefore, the United States would still have
been free to respond in self-defense in any domain they wished: cyber, land, air, or
sea. A cyberattack that would satisfy the tier one threshold would not be confined to
a proportionate response in cyberspace. Such a state would be free to choose to
respond in self-defense in any way they, and international law, deemed reasonable.
Such a response to a tier one cyberattack would not require permission from any
agency, committee, or organization, as was the case with 9/11. The response would
be immediate and necessary because of its magnitude and severity. Unfortunately,
because lawmakers currently quibble over defining an act of war in cyberspace
rather than looking to the scale and effects of cyberattacks on states, there remains
113
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nothing but speculative countermeasures to be implemented by a victim state. This
tier also coincides with the Caroline test discussed above for anticipatory selfdefense.117
Tier two, the second highest tier, would be similar to a tier one attack. However,
if the cyberattack did not result in the loss of life or significant destruction of
property but merely impairment or temporary interference with a nation’s critical
defenses, infrastructure, or resources, the initial attack would be referred to an
international committee, such as the UN, the ICJ, or some newly enacted
international organization that can efficiently and competently answer the question
of cyber issues and self-defense. For example, NATO must determine for itself that
an armed attack occurred to trigger the collective or individual self-defense
provision in article V of the treaty.118 The response, if permitted, would resemble the
response triggered in a tier one attack: any action necessary to quell the initial threat.
The only difference would be timing. An example of a tier two attack might be an
impairment in military defenses, or national satellites that are so crucial to a nation’s
resources and defenses.
Tier three, the third and lowest tier, would more closely resemble cyber
exploitation as it is defined above.119 Such an attack does not result in significant
destruction of property or the loss of lives, nor is it intended to. It is intended to
fracture or weaken a government’s infrastructure, or even society at large, which is
unacceptable. Like a tier two attack, the initial attack would be referred to an
international committee, such as the UN, the ICJ, or some newly enacted
international organization that can efficiently and competently answer the question
of cyber issues and self-defense to provide guidance on further action.
In most circumstances, if the source of an attack could be identified, a
proportionate countermeasure would be the most effective response as that term is
defined above. The countermeasure would act as both a punitive measure against a
state and as a deterrent effect to other nations. Additionally, it would be reflective in
both kind and degree to the initial attack. The example used above was an attack on
a state’s electrical generating facility at a dam to control the flow of water.120 The
appropriate countermeasure, under this tier, would be reflective of the first attack,
“such as cyber operations against [the offending state’s] irrigation control
system.”121 This position is reflective of rule 14 established in the Tallinn Manual,
which reads “[a] use of force involving cyber operations undertaken by a State in
the exercise of its right of self-defen[s]e must be necessary and proportionate.”122
Such a response is not without its flaws. A proportionate countermeasure
against an offending state may not have the same impact as it did on the victim state
because injury is relative. For example, if the offending state is a less-developed
117
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nation as compared to the victim state, then the harm caused by a responsive
cyberattack would not be as deleterious. Moreover, it would be more difficult to
identify attacks by organizations without tangible boundaries by design—such as
ISIS—in cyberspace. Essentially, more developed nations have more to lose. This,
in turn, reduces the deterrent effect that underlies the policy behind a
countermeasure. However, less-developed nations would be less inclined to execute
a sophisticated attack in cyberspace merely because of resources and capability.
Despite this somewhat paradoxical effect, lines must be drawn somewhere, and the
response argued in a tier three attack appears to be the most reasonable and
appropriate response considering the world as a whole.
V. RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND
SIMILAR TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
This Note demonstrates the prevalence of cyber issues. These issues will only
increase and escalate as time and technology progresses. It may even reach a point
where wars are substantially—or even exclusively—fought in cyberspace. Despite
the worldwide fear of cyberspace and our attempts to thwart cybercrime,
cyberattacks, and cyber exploitation, “there are no treaty provisions that directly deal
with ‘cyber warfare.’”123
One of the leading military alliances and treaties today is the North Atlantic
Treaty. “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United
States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security
against the Soviet Union.”124 Despite NATO’s prestige and prevalence, its treaty has
not yet developed responses to cyberattacks. Nor has most of the modern world in
any treaty, nor in any international or domestic law. It is therefore imperative that
our laws change with society and technology. It is not acceptable to await
devastating attacks in cyberspace before we enact modifications to our existing laws.
We must prepare ourselves now. That first requires evolving treaties and laws to
reflect the evolution occurring in warfare. Thus, to the extent possible, states and
organizations such as NATO, should take appropriate steps to enact new laws or
treaties to implement the suggestions argued in this Note to minimize the impending
risk that cyberspace brings.
This Note concludes that cyberattacks can constitute an act of war when they
rise to that level, and suggests how we should respond to such attacks. This Note
recommends that international law and treaties adopt this framework—or another
akin to it—in order to more confidently face cyberwarfare and its devastating future.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a sense, war has not changed. The end results will always remain the same:
death and destruction; even if that destruction is not fully tangible. The results may
be instantaneous, or they may be delayed. It is only the means implemented to
achieve these destructive ends that evolve. Cyberwarfare is a product of that
evolution. Most importantly, we must always remain abreast of evolution and the
changes in warfare in order to effectively and efficiently respond to new attacks, and
to prevent them as well.
This Note sheds light on recent evolution in warfare. It enlightens the reader of
the history and science behind cyberattacks through recent incidents involving
cyber; argues that cyberattacks can constitute an act of war in international law by
triggering the right to self-defense; proposes a tiered analysis in order to effectively,
proportionally, and legally respond to attacks in cyberspace; and recommends that
the international and national community take the necessary measures to implement
this suggestion in order to prepare for the inevitable: a devastating cyberattack.

